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THE IRANIAN MODEL OF THE RESISTANCE ECONOMY: LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RUSSIA

ИРАНСКАЯ МОДЕЛЬ ЭКОНОМИКИ УСТОЙЧИВОСТИ: УРОКИ И РЕКОМЕНДАЦИИ ДЛЯ РОССИИ



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The term of the resistance economy has been one of the most important topics of interest in Iran over the past decade, which is addressed as the main strategy of Iran to neutralize the negative consequences of the imposed sanctions by the West. *The purpose of this research* is to investigate the concept of resistance economy in the economic literature of Iran and Russia, to investigate the policies of the resistance economy of these two countries against economic sanctions. Also, in this article, the examined similarities and differences of the concept of resistance economy in two countries are described. The main conclusions highlight the positive impact of this strategy in order to mitigate the negative consequences of the financial and economic sanctions imposed by the western block. However, Iran and Russia should pay more attention to the advantages of multilateralism and regionalism in economic interactions beyond the western sanctions

Key words: *resiliency economy, Russia, Iran, imposed sanctions, economic security, recommendations, lessons, strategy, regionalism, economic relations*

Термин «экономика сопротивления» был одной из важнейших тем, интересующих Иран за последнее десятилетие, что рассматривается как основная стратегия Ирана по нейтрализации негативных последствий введенных Западом санкций. *Целью* данной работы является исследование концепции экономики сопротивления в экономической литературе Ирана и России, изучение политики экономики сопротивления этих двух стран экономическим санкциям. Также в статье мы рассмотрим сходства и различия концепции экономики сопротивления в двух странах. Основные выводы подчеркивают положительное влияние этой стратегии на смягчение негативных последствий финансовых и экономических санкций, введенных западным блоком. Однако Ирану и России следует уделять больше внимания преимуществам многосторонности и регионализма в экономических отношениях за рамками западных санкций

Ключевые слова: *экономика устойчивости, Россия, Иран, наложенные санкции, экономическая безопасность, рекомендации, уроки, стратегия, регионализм, экономические отношения*

Economic sanctions have always had a devastating effect on the structure of the countries' economies, especially developing ones, such as Iran and Russia. These countries have used an anti-sanction economic approach to counter the imposed Western sanctions. Economic sanctions are manipulations of economic relations to achieve political goals (16, p. 393). In recent

decades, economic sanctions have been seen as the best policy to replace military instruments with cheaper analogues (7, p.18). For this reason the countries use economic sanctions to achieve their political goals, such as regime change or changing the political behavior of targeted countries. In other words, the sanctions wars of the last decades are a kind of hybrid wars that are being waged

against countries that play a significant political and economic role in their region (2, c. 3), such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation. Both of these countries have a vast territory and a large population, and are among the largest oil exporters. Both countries have been sanctioned by Western block that disagree with specific political and other actions of Iran and Russia. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran's economy has always been subject to threats and sanctions imposed by the Western block.

Sanctions against Iran can be divided into four periods. The first stage dates back to 1978–1980, when the import of any food and medicines to Iran was banned by American banks. In addition, Americans were prohibited from having any financial dealings with Iranians, and the United States banned all imports from Iran, as well as all travel to or from Iran. In addition, all military equipment purchased or ordered by the Iranian government was confiscated. The second stage was carried out in 1983–1995. This tap was characterized by strict control over the export of military equipment to Iran, a ban on the import of American goods and products to Iran, a ban on imports, exports and mutual investments between Iran and the United States. The third stage of sanctions began in 1996. At this stage, until 2004, the approval of sanctions against Iran and Libya, the inclusion of Iranian banks, companies and a number of institutions associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the list of sanctions were implemented. At the fourth stage of the sanctions, which have been in effect 2010 in order to slow down the growth of Iran's nuclear potential, restrictions were imposed on the export of Iranian oil, measures against the Central Bank of the Iran.

In recent years, as a result of cooperation within JCPOA¹, the destructive impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy has decreased to some extent. But the violation of the treaty by the US officials and the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA led to the fact that the Iranian economy is still living in a sanctions war. The modern history of Western sanctions against Russia is connected with the aggravation of its relations with Ukraine and the subsequent separation of Crimea in 2014. The sanctions, which began with the blocking of assets and the ban on the departure of some Russian citizens, led to re-

strictions on investments in large Russian energy companies, as well as restrictions on capital inflows to large Russian banks (1, p.12). Russia has pursued a policy of easing the consequences of sanctions for its economy, as well as counter-sanctions against Western countries, especially European ones. Moreover, from February 24, 2022, with the start of Russia's special military operation in the Ukraine, the political tension between Russia and the Western block has increased, and Western countries, led by the United States, increased the amount of sanctions against Russia. However, it seems that Russia's reaction and policies against these sanctions have been significant and can generally be analyzed and interpreted in the form of "resistance economy" policies.

The purpose of this research is to investigate the concept of resiliency economy in the economic literature of Iran and Russia, to investigate the policies of the resiliency economy of these two countries against economic sanctions. The research method of this study is qualitative, descriptive and analytical. For this purpose the library information collection approach has been used. Also, documents and thematic analysis have been used to compare the concept of resiliency economy in the two countries of Iran and Russia.

The structure of the article is organized as follows: Next Section represents a brief explanation of resistance economy in Iran. Then, the policy of resistance economy in Russia is discussed. The comparisons of resistance economy in Iran and Russia are done in next Section. The last Section tries to provide concluding remarks and practical policy implications.

Resistance economy in Iran: Characteristics and aspects. With the advent of the Islamic Revolution, a new government appeared in the world, which was incompatible with the pole of power of arrogance and began to fight against it. The emergence of such a government in the Middle East, which is very important from an economic and geopolitical point of view, forced the global system of arrogance to fight the revolution with all its might. With the end of the war and the lack of victory of arrogance in the military areas, the attacks were extended to other areas. One such area that has been associated with large-scale attacks, especially in recent years, is the economic zone (6, p. 5). Therefore, the Islamic Revolution of

¹ Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Iran is obliged to introduce innovations, theorize and model in new economic fields. Every country that creates the science of combating arrogance needs such models. One such concept is the economics of resiliency.

The importance of this issue lies in the fact that the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution named the years under the same name in 1395 (Economy of Resistance; Actions and Actions) and 1396 (Economy of Resistance, Production-Employment), as well as indirectly in other years. Such as 1387 (the year of innovation and prosperity), 1388 (the year of progress towards reforming the structure of consumption), 1389 (the year of double efforts, double work), 1390 (the year of economic jihad), 1391 (national production and support of Iranian labor and capital), 1392 (political epic and economic epic). Given the economic threats from Western countries, the potential of the country's labor and capital, as well as the importance of economic growth based on domestic opportunities, the issue of the economy of resistance is considered an important and influential issue for the country of Iran. It is possible that the indication of this years directly or indirectly by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution is a confirmation of the importance and necessity of this concept for the country of Iran.

Strategic Concerns of the Resiliency Economy. Calls for a 'resiliency economy' in Iran came after years of external aggression. They emerged in the context of Iran's '20 year national vision' announced in 2005. The principles at that time included calls for Iran to become a developed country "founded on ethical principles and Islamic, national and revolutionary values" which will take a lead in "advanced knowledge, economy, science and technology" [11]. The national vision goals suggested that Iran should be "a fully advanced country, rising to the number-one rank in economic, scientific and technological progress among 28 nations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia". This would entail (a) achievement of fast-paced and sustainable economic growth; (b) creation of durable employment opportunities; (c) enhancement of factor productivity; (d) active presence in regional and international markets; (e) development of a diverse, knowledge-based economy, free of inflation and blessed by food security; and (f) establishment of a market environment conducive to domestic and international business entrepreneurship" [4]. In addition, an implicit request was made to move from dependency on oil and gas. However, a new wave of economic aggres-

sion ('sanctions') was undertaken by the US and Israeli attempts to block Iran's nuclear program. In such circumstances, Iran's supreme leader elaborated his concept of an "economy of resiliency" in 2012. According to him, "the enemy's goal was to focus on our economy, work against our national growth, undermine efforts to create employment opportunities, disrupt and jeopardize our national welfare, create problems for the people, make the people disappointed and isolate them from the Islamic Republic" [12]. In response to that, Iran's leader suggested "an economy of resiliency which meant putting the people in charge of the economy minimizing the country's dependence on oil managing consumption - that is to say, moderate consumption and avoidance of extravagance making the best of the available time, resources and facilities moving forward on the basis of plans reliance on domestic talents, on the domestic capacities of the country. Furthermore, special attention was given to the capacities of the youth, their creativeness, the tasks they can manage and follow, the knowledge that they acquire, and the knowledge that they turn into technology" [12; 13]. The concept can be summed up as a process to achieve growth, diversification and prosperity under pressure from western countries. Iran would support local industries to turn threats into opportunities [18].

Based on this proposition, one can observe several articulated strategic concerns, beginning with a concerted effort to boost domestic production. How could the threats be turned into opportunities? Sanctions during the administrations of President Khatami and President Ahmadinejad had already "stimulated Iran's industrial development, insofar as they kept foreign competition at bay. Iran was in fact able to become something of an industrial powerhouse" [18]. The proposed resiliency economy emphasised national production, with specific roles for the government, cooperatives and workers, but including elites and their technologies. Increasing national production implied stabilising the economy, boosting innovative national production and reducing dependence on oil revenues [10, p. 648-651].

The country's industrial development, whilst targeted and threatened due to numerous sanctions, included eliminating imports of steel and fuel. Indeed, the US-based International Trade Administration recognised that between 2015 and 2018, Iran had moved from a net importer of steel into one of the world's top 20 steel exporters [9]. Steel production averaged more than 2 million

tons per month from October 2018 to June 2019 (Trading Economics, 2019) or 25 million tons per year (13). Today, Iran no longer exports crude oil to import fuel, because its expanded refinery capacity has ensured national fuel self-sufficiency [14]. The country's mobile telephone and computer hardware sector is well advanced [15]. Motor vehicle production, including export production, has grown strongly and will grow more since the time when US third party sanctions forced French automakers (Renault, Peugeot and Citroen) to withdraw. A foreign industry analyst termed Iran's motor vehicle market (2019-2024) a "consolidated market with strong growth prospects". Meanwhile, Iran has been reverse engineering foreign built tunnelling machines and pharmaceuticals. Barakat pharmaceutical town (Alborz province), opened in 2018, employs 7,000 and indirectly another 30,000 (10). In many of these cases, an export potential has been built.

Outside commentators sometimes speak of a 'securitization' of the Iranian economy, indicating that security forces have come to play an important economic role. Toumaj (2014) observes that the resiliency economy implies 'securitization', where the security forces, including the IRGC, play an important role in managing both economic policy and strategic enterprise. The Intelligence Ministry has also become involved, as economic concerns are linked to Iran's strategic position in the region, with Iran looking to a multipolar world and greater linkages with Asia [19, p. 7–8].

The idea of greater participation in a resiliency economy has been linked to Article 44 of the Iranian Constitution, which requires the state, cooperative and private sectors to contribute to development, under a planned system. As regards to 'resiliency,' there have been calls for further empowering of the private sector, decreasing the country's dependence on oil, while promoting more efficient resource management and stable planning [8].

Internal management and planning challenges are linked to participation; that is, the Iranian state has to foment this participation while overcoming its own problems. In 2012, the President of the Iranian Parliament, Ali Larijani, claimed that foreign sanctions only accounted for 20% of Iran's economic problems of inflation, foreign exchange and production, and that domestic mismanagement was a more significant problem in Iran [8]. Recriminations over the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal, over which the liberals were rather enthu-

siastic, also illustrate the internal division in the country.

The economy of resistance in the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The topic of economics of resistance or economic immunity and the need to pay attention to it is not specific to the time of embargo and war (although in some studies, the economy of resistance is a state in which system is in a state of serious threat to itself from the enemy. The economy of resistance means the ability of an economic system to continue to function at an acceptable level after the occurrence of such an impulse as sanctions, and in fact, this is a long-term prospect for the Iranian economy. This concept, which is part of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, can lead to the prosperity of the economy and solve the problems in the economic sub-sectors of the country, even under the threat or sanctions of the enemies an economy of resistance active and dynamic is necessary. Strategic and strategic planning is based on popularizing the economy by giving more space to private sector activists and removing obstacles and problems from this sector.

Due to the importance of the country's general attention to the issue of the resistance economy, on February 30, 2013, the Supreme Leader explained the text of the notification of the general policies of the resistance economy to the leaders of the three forces and the leader of the Opportunity Council. In the text of the notification, he considered the economy of resistance as equivalent to the indigenous and scientific economic model derived from the revolutionary and Islamic culture, and to implement it according to the abundant spiritual and material talents, reserves and rich and diverse resources, and infrastructures that are extensive and more important than anything, with a committed and efficient human force with a firm desire for progress, providing an appropriate solution to overcome economic problems. An inspiring model of the economic system of Islam has been listed. Ishan, 24 paragraphs of resistance economy policy, such as providing conditions and activating all financial facilities and resources and human capital, paying attention to knowledge-based economy, focusing on productivity growth in the economy, ensuring the security of food and medicines, consumption management, reform of the country's financial system, targeted global support for the export of goods, development of foreign trade services, stabilization of procedures and regulations relating to exports,

Developing the scope of free zones and special economic zones, dealing with the vulnerability of oil and gas export revenue, saving the country's government expenditure, reforming the government revenue system, increasing the share of the National Fund for development every year, with the objective of ensuring dynamic growth and improving economic resilience indicators and achieving the objectives of the twenty year vision document, he announced.

Analyzing the political positions of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, several key elements can be identified. The first element consists of economic institutions, which are indicated in the text of the economic policy of the resistance based on the constitution and the concept document. The second element consists of organizations or economic sectors, which are defined in the policy of the economy of resistance and the supreme documents of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The third key element consists of economic agents or intermediaries who cooperate with organizations within the framework of economic rules and regulations. Thus, it can be noted that information about the policy of the resistance economy is not addressed to one institution, organization or intermediary, and all economic actors must create a transformation based on the resistance economy.

The Economy of Resistance in Russia. The term "economy of resistance" in the Russian academic literature is often referred to under two names "economy of anti-sanctions" and "economy of resistance". In many sources, the date of the beginning of this concept in Russia dates back to the blockade of the city of Leningrad (the current city of St. Petersburg) The Soviet Union for more than 2 years by the German army during World War II. When a large number of factories and economic infrastructures were destroyed as a result of the bombing of aircraft of the Nazi German army and its allies, and in response to these sad economic events, the command of the Russian army at that time prevented a complete paralysis of the economy of this city by managing economic resources. They fought, of course, at the moment the concept of "economic resistance is more than the economy of resistance" is felt. From a conceptual point of view, it can be noted that the concept of economic resistance is a reaction or reaction,

and the economy of resistance is an action or action. Economic resistance arises after the onset of an unexpected event, such as war, embargo, etc. in the country and mainly leads to austerity, while the economy of resistance is a promising policy and represents an action or action that leads to the creation of a strong economic system without weaknesses.

Historically, over time and with the strengthening of Western sanctions against the Russian Federation, especially after the tensions that have arisen in the Ukraine since 2014² the economy of resistance it has acquired the importance of the economy against sanctions. An economy that may be less vulnerable during sanctions, may strike a blow to the economies of the sanctioned countries. In general, when a country can increase its influence in the economy of different countries and link their lives with its own economy, the risk of sanctions will be reduced by them. Thus, an important political difference that can be seen in this type of resistance economy is the desire for economic influence in the countries that impose sanctions which are mainly the United States and the European Union, along with protecting the economy from the negative effects of sanctions and restrictions.

Legally, the beginning of the new resistance economy in Russia dates back to 2007, when the Russian economic policies were directed towards the development of the state-owned enterprises sector and the development of financial system activities in Global level moved. The result of these policies was to strengthen Russia's economic status in global markets and increase Russia's competitive power in global financial markets. Also, in January 2010, the President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, signed the "Food Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation" law. Due to the dependence of the import of food and agricultural products from Western European countries (about 40% in 2010), this law created a new chapter in economic activities inside Russia. The period based on which the sustainable development of Russian food production is established. On August 6, 2014, Vladimir Putin, signed the law on the specialization of economic sectors in order to ensure the economic security of the Russian Federation in such a way that with the imposition of Western economic sanctions

² Sanctions against Russia signed by US President Barack Obama on March 6, 2014. started in 2014 and supported by the European Union, Australia, Canada and Norway.

against Russia in 2014, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, ordered to ban the entry of food products. It exported meat, dairy products, fish, vegetables and fruits from Western Europe. With the extension of sanctions against Russia by the European Union on June 22, 2015 for six months, on June 25 of the same year, the President of Russia extended the embargo on the import of agricultural goods from this union and its partners until August 6, 2016. Along with the sanctions and anti-sanctions policies in the field of agricultural products, many large American companies such as ExxonMobil, which were engaged in energy projects, especially the oil and gas fields of this country began to reduce their activities in this country. By exerting pressure on the price of its energy exports to the Ukraine and the European Union, Russia was able to return those companies to activity or develop the activities of other large international oil companies in their country [20]. Also, a part of the sanctions of the Western countries (especially the member states of the European Union) was against the banking industry and the access of this country's banks to the global financial flow was restricted. The purpose of applying these sanctions was to cut off the access of the large banks of the Russian Federation to the capital markets of the European Union [3]. These financial sanctions, as well as the sale of bonds Russian companies were restricted by the country's banks and their financial services in the European Union.

In response to these measures, the Central Bank of Russia took measures to restrict the activities of foreign banks in the country, and also applied monetary policy rate to eliminate

the negative consequences of these sanctions. When implementing a resistance economy, timely policy implementation is appropriate. Conducting the right and excellent monetary policy at the wrong time is ineffective. Studies such as the Ankudinov et al [5] study show that the Russian stock market has not suffered a structural failure due to sanctions. And the fluctuations of this market had no significant connection with the imposition of sanctions. The moment to pay attention to is the changes in the volume of Russia's GDP at the time of the imposition of sanctions. The following table shows the volume of Russia's GDP by quarter of the year. The years 2011–2016 are shown in the prices of the base year 2011.

The table above shows that the gross domestic product of Russia in the quarters of 2015 decreased compared to 2014. Also, this variable decreased by 16.1% in 2016 compared to its value in 2015. But it should be said that the decline in GDP was greater than the effect of sanctions, due to the sharp drop in world oil prices. Therefore, in your analysis, the role of one of the important points in the sustainability of the Russian economy should be the availability of planning and the identification of accelerating levers to achieve economic immunity in this country. The task of planning and identifying accelerators of the resistance economy was carried out in 2014–2015 in Russia and was designated as follows:

A. Development of the agricultural sector and domestic fisheries

B. Development and localization of technologies
C- Development of domestic logistics networks

Table 1 / Таблица 1

GDP of Russia, 2011–2016 / Внутренний валовой продукт (ВВП) России, 2011–2016 гг.

Three months of the year / Триместр	Gross domestic product (GDP) of Russia / Внутренний валовой продукт (ВВП) России					
	2011 г.	2012 г.	2013 г.	2014 г.	2015 г.	2016 г.
First three months / Первый триместр	13255,3	13954,6	14039,4	14119,9	13736,2	13576,2
Second trimester / Второй триместр	14345,3	14961,0	15131,0	15297,41	14605,4	14522,1
Third trimester / Третий триместр	15615,1	16102,3	16289,6	15432,6	15823,6	15433,7
Fourth trimester / Четвертый триместр	16482,4	16780,4	17128,9	17171,1	16516,8	16482,48

Source 1 – Statistical Center of the Russian Federation³

³ http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/importexchange/

C. Creating greater coordination between agricultural production and trade networks

D. The development of greater cooperation with the countries of the region and the creation of an internal payment system, for example, in the case of the acceleration lever "A", that is, the development of the agricultural sector, is seen due to sanctions imposed on Russia by Western governments since 2014, and tensions between Russia and Turkey, the production of domestic agricultural products in the post-sanctions years.

In general, the importance of defining these levers has also been mentioned in the literature on Iran's resistance economy. The first priority in the economy of resistance is the analysis of pressure points. In general, these points are weaknesses and a sign of our dependence on foreigners, and we must focus on them in order to turn weaknesses into strengths and threats into opportunities.

As for the feedback of the anti-sanctions economy or, in other words, the economy of resistance to Russia, in a research survey by the Levada Center Research Center, Russians were asked two questions, and the following results were obtained?

As to whether Russia will continue to resist or the anti-sanctions economy or not? 72 % (totally agree and agree), 18 % (totally disagree and disagree) and 10 % had no opinion.

Regarding the use of domestic products under the embargo, 76 % of respondents fully agreed and agreed with the use of domestic products.

The results of this survey have shown that the Russians support the economic policy of the country's resistance to economic sanctions. This moment is a prerequisite of national determination in the economy of resistance, which is also expressed in the literature defining this concept in the economy of Iran. When the alignment of the members of society with the economic policy of the resistance is established, the national production and consumption of domestic products will be more developed and will make a great contribution to the expansion of the economic opportunities of the country.

Similarities between the resistance economy in Iran and Russia. In the previous section, we explained the concept and policy of the resistance economy in Russia. In this section, we will try to compare the similarities and differences of the Russian resistance economy with this concept in Iran. But the first step to better understand the differences and similarities between the two economies of Iran and Russia is to compare the macroeconomic variables of the two countries in the table to understand the economic differences. Differences and similarities let's look at the concept of the resistance economy in these two countries. It should be noted that due to the observation of differences in the databases of the two countries and the world, the authoritative database of the World Bank was used to reduce the likelihood of errors from two different databases. It should also be noted that in addition to the sanctions imposed by Western countries since 2014, the Russian

Table 2 / Таблица 2

*Comparison of macroeconomic variables of Iran and Russia, 2000–2021 /
Сравнение макроэкономических переменных Ирана и России, 2000–2021 гг.*

Economic variable / Экономическая составляющая	Countries / страны	average of 2000–2005 / средний показатель 2000–2005 гг.	average of 2005–2010 / средний показатель 2005–2010 гг.	average of 2010–2015 / средний показатель 2010–2015 гг.	2021
Annual economic growth / Еже- годный экономический рост	Iran	5/58	4/80	1/28	1/8
	Russia	4/78	4/16	1/75	4/8
Degree of trade openness / Степень открытости торговли	Iran	48/29	50/55	41/66	46
	Russia	60/22	52/55	48/92	52
Inflation / Инфляция	Iran	20/20	14/98	19/72	30/6
	Russia	20/50	13/73	11/26	6/7
Urbanization growth / Рост урбанизации	Iran	2/40	2/05	2/02	1/8
	Russia	0/23	-0/08	-0/39	-0/2
Unemployment (% of total labor force) / Безработица (% от общей численности рабочей силы)	Iran	12/82	11/71	12/03	11/5
	Russia	6/03	7	8/43	5

Source 2 – World Bank

economy has faced such problems as a sharp decline in world oil prices, an increase in the value of the dollar, euro and other currencies and recently the Russia-Ukraine political tension.

According to the above table, the 5-year average for 15 years from 2000 to 2015, and 2021, the economic variables of these two countries are very close to each other, except for the growth of urbanization, unemployment and inflation rate, it should be noted that some factors, such as the uniform development of cities, the existence of a law on the registration of citizens, the degree of turnover of people It has significantly decreased in the regions of Russia. The proximity of the rates of movement and changes in economic variables in the two countries is a confirmation of the similarity of their economic behavior. Thus, the model of the resistance economy used in Russia can be used with minor changes. Although it should be noted that there are economic differences in these two countries, and this is not without influence on the development and implementation of the resistance economy. But assuming the absence or stability of these differences, a useful comparative study can be conducted.

From the point of view of similarity, first of all it should be noted that in both countries the use and implementation of this concept is defined as a basic solution for strengthening the domestic economy. A solution that makes any threat or economic sanctions from one or more third countries is ineffective or less effective. Thus, from the point of view of economic beliefs, in both countries, the basis and the basis for combating the negative consequences of economic sanctions is the implementation of an economic policy of resistance. Russia's first priority in the fight against Western sanctions was the implementation of an anti-sanctions economic policy. Many studies conducted in Iran have shown an inverse relationship between the economy of resistance and the negative effects of sanctions.

Secondly, there is national coherence and unity in the implementation of the resistance economy in both countries. When the people of society who are producers and consumers of the economic market understand the importance and necessity of the resistance economy, its implementation will be easier, because the National Alliance, in the context of adopting various aspects of its resistance economy, brings with it a reform of the consumption structure and the theme of supporting domestic producers.

Thirdly, the economy of resistance has led to such a turn in the foreign trade policy of these two countries that their import and export markets have become Asian and anti European.

Conclusions and policy implications. According to the definition of the economic resiliency given by some economists, this type of strategy is usually in confrontation with the dependent and consumer economy of a country that is not passive and opposes the economic goals of domination and tries to change the existing economic structures and localization. In order to continue this type of strategy, it is necessary to move as much as possible in the direction of limiting the use of oil resources and getting rid of the dependence of the country's economy on these resources, and it should be noted that the economy of resiliency makes sense in a situation where there is a war against economic war, as well as a soft war of the enemy – that's where the economy of resiliency makes sense.

The authors have examined the concept of the resistance economy in Russia as a developing oil economy, which has much in common with the economy of Iran. The results showed that historically the use of the concept of the economy of resistance in Russia (former Soviet Union) during the Second World War and during the siege of Leningrad, economic resistance means more than the economy of resistance, but since 2014 and with the beginning of Western sanctions against Russia, the concept of the economy of resistance in this country has received a new coloring and its various policies, such as the development of import substitution, increased consumption of domestic goods, substitution of trading partners, etc. were quickly implemented. However, one of the notable differences between the concept of the resistance economy in this country and this concept in Iran is its defensive state. In the sense that Russia not only seeks to protect its domestic economy, but also some of the economic resistance strategies of this country seek to attack and strike at the economies of the embargoed countries. In addition, the use of the concept of the economy of resistance in Iran has a broader scope. Thus, the implementation and existence of this concept is not characteristic of the time of threats and sanctions in Western countries, while in Russia this concept refers only to the time of sanctions, and in the economic literature of this country it is also referred to in the meaning of "anti-sanctions economy".

Based on the study and review of the concept of the economy of resistance and its operational aspects in Russia, the proposed strategic policy for a better and more effective implementation of this concept in Iran includes the point that with the regional and global development of the economy, the expansion of the capabilities of this economy through the economy of Resistance occurs faster and more efficiently. Under the pressure of Western sanctions, Iran and Russia should pay more attention to Asian markets.

Greater interaction with emerging markets in Asia and concluding economic and commercial cooperation agreements with these countries will greatly help Iran and Russia in neutralizing the negative effects of economic sanctions. Paying attention to the two policies of regionalism and multilateralism in trade and economic cooperation can be the two strategic and practical programs of the two countries of Iran and Russia under the important economic program of resistance against western sanctions.

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